Abstract -Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman have proposed a ring signature scheme, which is signerambiguous and setup-free. Bresson, Stern, and Szydlo have extended it to a threshold ring signature scheme. In this paper, we propose another type of the threshold ring signature scheme. While the sequence of signatures of the previous ring signature schemes forms geometrically a ring, that of the proposed scheme forms a curve.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [l] have proposed a ring signature scheme (the RST scheme), which makes it possible to specify a group without revealing which member signed a message. Since the signer does not need any cooperation of other members for generating a signature, the ring signature is applicable to whistle-blowing. Bresson, Stern, and Szydlo have proposed a threshold ring signature scheme (the BSS scheme) [2] . In the BSS scheme, the verifier can confirm that k members in the group signed the message, but cannot identify even one of the signers.
In this paper, we propose another threshold ring signature scheme. Although the BSS scheme is the natural extension of the RST scheme, the proposed scheme is based on the idea of Shamir's secret sharing scheme [3] . Similar to the RST scheme and the BSS scheme, the proposed scheme achieves the unconditional anonymity of signers.
11. PROPOSED SCHEME A member i uses a trapdoor one-way permutation f, to generate and verify a signature. Although each of fi usually has a different domain, the use of the common domain method enables us to assume that all domains are almost same [I];
given z in the common domain (0, l}', z is also an element in the domain of fi with overwhelming probability.
Suppose that a set of members is R = {1,2,. . . , n}. We denote by S and s a set of k signers and that of n -k nonsigners, respectively. Here, S U s = R and S n S = 0. 
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where h : (0,l)' -+ (0, l}b and h' : (0,1}* -+ (O,l}' are public collision-resistant hash functions and Pi is the verifying key of a member i. step 2 The signers randomly choose ai,Pi (i E S ) from (0,l)'. Then, they compute xi = EZ(fi(cyi)) and yi = E,(fi(Pi)) where E is a public symmetric cipher with block length b and key length C. step 3 The signers determine the curve C that goes through
Notice that an element in (0, l}b can be considered as an element in GF(2'). If c,,-k = 0, then the signers go back to step 2; this probability is 2-'. step 4 The signers randomly choose 2% (z E S ) from (0, l}b.
Then, they compute yz = c(z,). Using their secret keys, they compute a, = f,-'(EJ1(zS)) and P, = step 5 The threshold ring signature of m is given by um = f%-(E; (Yz )).
(C, k, (PZ, a,, Pz) (2 E RI).
Verification Algorithm step 1 A verifier checks that C is the ( n -k)-degree curve over GF (2' ) and each of (ayz,&) (z E R) is a pair of elements in GF(2'). If one of them is not satisfied, then the verifier rejects m and k.
step 2 The verifier computes z = h ' ( m , k , 4 , P 2 ,..., Pn).
Moreover, the verifier computes z, and U, as follows: 
There are many higher-degree curves that g o through the (n+ 1) points (zz,y2). Since the degree of C commits the number of signers k, the verifier must check the degree of C .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown the threshold ring signature scheme based on the idea of Shamir's secret sharing scheme. While the sequence of signatures of the original ring signature forms geometrically the ring, that of the proposed scheme forms the curve. Assuming that the hash functions h,h' and the symmetric block cipher E are random oracles, we can prove that the proposed scheme is secure against forgery under the random oracle model.
